Abstract

Since Auguste Comte, altruism has been regarded as a central concept in ethics and political philosophy. This paper argues that there are two fundamentally distinct kinds of altruism: monistic altruism and altruism toward the other. The first, monistic altruism, is grounded in the assumption that any distinction between self and other lacks ultimate validity. A typical expression of this form can be found in the Mahāyāna Buddhist and Hindu traditions. For instance, Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of emptiness undermines any clear boundary between self and other, while Śaṅkara’s pantheistic view maintains that Brahman alone is the ultimate reality, thereby dissolving the individuality of beings within the one absolute. The second, altruism toward the other, is exemplified by the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, which puts a significant emphasis on the irreducibility and ethical priority of the Other. Since this perspective regards the encounter with the Other as foundational to ethics, it is generally critical of monistic views that seek to overcome or erase the distinction between self and other. Nevertheless, not all philosophies within the Mahāyāna tradition are undermined by such a criticism, for some of them are not committed to the form of monistic metaphysics.