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This paper provides an investigation into the relationship between AI language technologies and human language creativity from the perspective of later Wittgensteinian philosophy in language. The paper begins with an introduction to the development of AI language technology, mainly focusing on the Bayesian Principle and Connectionism, and the significance of creativity in human language use. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s concepts of “language games” and “forms of life”, the paper analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of AI language technologies in terms of human intentionality and creativity. The benefits lie in the improved efficiency of language-related tasks and the opening up of new avenues for creativity exploration, while the disadvantages primarily lie in the genuine comprehension and originality of AI, as well as the potential negative impacts and risks on human creativity. The paper argues that while AI language technologies offer certain conveniences and new creative possibilities, they cannot replace the unique role of human intentionality and creativity. Finally, the limitations and future trends of current AI language technologies are discussed, emphasizing the need and exploring ways for AI to work in harmony with human creativity.
AI language technologies; human creativity; later Wittgensteinian philosophy; language games; life forms
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An Investigation on AI Language Technologies and Human Language Creativity from a Later Wittgensteinian Perspective
How to cite this paper: Fayang Huang. (2026) An Investigation on AI Language Technologies and Human Language Creativity from a Later Wittgensteinian Perspective. Journal of Humanities, Arts and Social Science, 10(4), 427-432.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.26855/jhass.2026.04.005